Dispatch, SA

2008/07/02

INSIGHT

Philip Cole

ROBERT Mugabe has again been declared president of Zimbabwe, despite being
the only candidate in last week's election after Movement for Democratic
Change (MDC) leader Morgan Tsvangirai withdrew in the face of massive
violence and intimidation of his supporters.

The flawed "election result" has been greeted by worldwide condemnation of
Zanu -PF and its violent campaign of repression during the election. What is
likely to happen next?

The first thing to realise is that Mugabe is a very clever politician. Like
many of the most successful politicians, he is a survivor and his main
interest is in survival. He is also now tied at the hip to the corrupt and
repressive Zanu-PF hierarchy, especially the military that he has both
fostered and which is now his only prop to stay in power. Mugabe and Zanu-PF
are now gearing up for the end-game, and the "election" is part of their
strategy to negotiate from a position of strength.

And make no mistake, Zimbabwe has entered the end-game phase. The country
has sunk so low, with a collapsed economy and mass unemployment, that even
the most stubborn politicians in both Zanu-PF and the MDC will be forced to
the negotiating table. We are likely, sooner or later, to see a government
of national unity in Zimbabwe as part of a managed transition to new, free
and democratic elections.

Mugabe and the Zanu-PF elite are not fools - they know this. The declaration
of Mugabe as the new "president" is part of their strategy to negotiate from
a position of strength and ensure that they are able to get out of the
country with their money and their dignity intact.

For Zimbabwe, the question now is how to transfer power from a corrupt,
oppressive political-military elite that remains in firm control of the
country, to a democratic and inclusive society. South Africa has been in
this position before and we have both the recent experience and expertise to
help the transition. That is why President Thabo Mbeki's "quiet diplomacy"
is both the only show in town and the only strategy most likely to work.

It is an unpleasant fact to have to face, but if an oppressive government
cannot be defeated by force of arms or by popular demonstration, then an
accommodation must be reached with the dictators while they are still in
power. And part of that accommodation is unfortunately that they get out
with their money and reputations still intact.

The same thing happened in South Africa.

After the then-Prime Minister PW Botha failed to "cross the Rubicon" in
1984, South Africa erupted into a contained civil war for the rest of the
decade. The numbers of United Democratic Front (UDF) supporters dead and in
detention steadily rose, the bombing of "soft targets" increased - but there
was still no solution to the impasse. While South Africa's economy collapsed
and its isolation increased, the apartheid government remained in control
and its military remained undefeated. Something had to give to break the
impasse.

The turning point in the transition to a democratic state came when the
African National Congress realised that South Africa could not be militarily
defeated and that apartheid would have to be negotiated out of existence.
What would happen to the leaders of the apartheid government was a major
issue in the Convention for a Democratic South Africa (Codesa) negotiations
and in the subsequent transition to democracy. The compromise that was
agreed eventually was the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC). The
deal that was struck was that if apartheid's hit men and enforcers came
clean to the TRC, they would not be prosecuted and would be given amnesty
for their past abuses.

Make no mistake, there were many abuses that needed to be confessed. The ANC
submission to the TRC estimated that "the human cost (of apartheid) was
1.5million dead through military and economic action, most of them children,
while a further four million had been displaced from their homes". From 1985
to 1989, over 80000 people were detained without trial, of which 10000 were
"tortured, assaulted or in some way abused". Between 1990 and 1993, in the
run up to the elections "nearly 12000 civilians were killed and 20000 were
injured in thousands of incidents, including several major massacres".

The Human Rights Commission recorded the "accelerating pace of
assassinations of anti-apartheid figures: 28 in 1990, 60 in 1991 and 97 in
1992". This human cost dwarfs the cost of Mugabe's misrule in Zimbabwe.

The ANC, to achieve democracy, was forced to accept an accommodation with
apartheid's rulers. And the price of this accommodation was that the big
guys got off the hook. Botha, Defence Minister Magnus Malan and others were
allowed to thumb their collective noses at the TRC and refuse to testify
about their knowledge of death squads or covert operations, while Vlakplaas
commander Eugene de Kock and the other foot-soldiers were sent to rot in
jail.

We should not underestimate how morally repulsive this appears to the many
physically crushed, poverty- stricken victims of apartheid. Yet it was the
price of getting rid of its evil.

We must prepare ourselves for the same thing to happen in Zimbabwe. Mugabe
and the rest of the Zanu -PF high-ups know how they are going to negotiate
themselves out of existence. Their final destinations may be North Korea
rather than the wilderness, but they will make sure they get to keep their
US dollars and the last remaining pieces of prestige.

And here in South Africa we should realise that we have the competitive
advantage in negotiating an end to repulsive governments.

Let Mbeki get on with his "quiet diplomacy", however repulsive it may seem.
He knows how to shuffle dictators off into the sunset.

After all, the ANC has already done it here.

Philip Cole is an independent development economist based in East London